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FROM ANGOLA TO BANGLADESH TO BRAZIL, development projects 
forcibly displace millions of people every year.1 Despite the widespread 
recognition under international law that forced evictions,2 including those 
resulting from development,3 presumptively violate human rights,4 
governments in many instances have asserted the public interest as an 
“exceptional circumstance” to successfully circumvent the prohibition on 
forced evictions.5 These forced displacements are often illegal under 
international law yet are “almost never officially referred to as cases of forced 
 
  J.D., University of Michigan; B.A., Duke University. 
 1. See U.N. HABITAT, LOSING YOUR HOME: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF EVICTION 1 
(2011) [hereinafter U.N. HABITAT, LOSING YOUR HOME]. Development programs forcibly 
displaced approximately ten million people each year, or 200 million people, globally during the 
1980s and 1990s, and fifteen million people per year the following decade. Id. at 1 n.1. 
 2. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights defines “forced eviction” as 
“the permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families and/or communities 
from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate 
forms of legal or other protection.” U.N. COMM. ON ECON., SOC. & CULTURAL RIGHTS 
(CESCR), GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7: THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING (ART. 11(1)): 
FORCED EVICTIONS, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22 (1997) [hereinafter CESCR, GENERAL 
COMMENT NO. 7], available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/ 
47a70799d.html. 
 3. Id. ¶ 7. 
 4. See generally U.N. COMM. ON ECON., SOC. & CULTURAL RIGHTS (CESCR), GENERAL 
COMMENT NO. 4: THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING (ART. 11(1) OF THE COVENANT), ¶ 18, 
U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (1991) [hereinafter CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 4], available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/47a7079a1.html (“[T]he Committee considers that instances of 
forced evictions are prima facie incompatible with the requirements of the Covenant . . . .”). 
 5. See id. (Forced evictions “can only be justified in the most exceptional circumstances, and 
in accordance with the relevant principles of international law.”). 
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eviction”6: 
They are, instead, elaborately justified in the name of the broader public 
good and given developmental process names such as “infrastructural 
development,” “nature conservation,” “rural development,” “urban 
renewal,” “slum upgrading,” “eradication of slums” and “inner city 
regeneration.” This is not to say that none of the projects are genuinely 
aimed at the public interest. However, even in such public interest 
projects, the methods of decision-making, design and implementation, 
and specifically the manner in which the affected people are treated, 
would in the majority of cases qualify as forced evictions as defined under 
international law, . . . and would, therefore, amount to gross violations of 
human rights.7 
Existing obligations under international law make clear that, to 
overcome the prohibition on forced evictions, states must provide full 
justification and appropriate legal remedies when asserting an overriding 
public interest.8 However, in practice, States have engaged in forced 
evictions based on an asserted public interest without guaranteeing these 
protections.9  
Bank standards and United Nations (“U.N.”) guidelines applicable to 
development projects in many instances already provide for measures, such 
as eviction-impact assessments, designed to help mitigate risks and costs 
associated with development-based eviction.10 However, these standards and 
guidelines often do not require such measures until after a project has been 
determined to be in the public interest, and with little or no scrutiny of the 
 
 6. U.N. HABITAT, LOSING YOUR HOME, supra note 1, at 1. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 4, supra note 4, ¶ 18; CESCR, GENERAL 
COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶¶ 11, 14, 15. 
 9. See, e.g., HOUS. AND LAND RIGHTS NETWORK, HOW TO RESPOND TO FORCED 
EVICTIONS: A HANDBOOK FOR INDIA 3 (2014) (“[A]t least 65-70 million people have been 
displaced in India, as a result of . . . ‘development’ projects [in the public interest]. . . . The majority 
of those displaced have not received any resettlement of rehabilitation benefits from the state.”). 
 10. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, OP 4.12: Involuntary Resettlement ¶¶ 20, 26 (rev. 2013) [hereinafter 
WORLD BANK, OP 4.12], in THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONS MANUAL (rev. 2014), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/OPSMANUAL/Resources/EntireOM_External.pdf; 
WORLD BANK, OP 4.12 – Annex A: Involuntary Resettlement Instruments ¶ 14 (rev. 2011) [hereinafter 
WORLD BANK, OP 4.12 – Annex A], in THE WORLD BOOK OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra; IFC 
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON ENVTL. AND SOC. SUSTAINABILITY Standard 5, ¶ 19, at 17, ¶ 
31, at 25–26, Standard 1, ¶ 14, at 9–10 (Int’l Fin. Corp. 2012) [hereinafter IFC PERFORMANCE 
STANDARDS], available at http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/c8f524004a73daeca09afdf99 
8895a12/IFC_Performance_Standards.pdf?MOD=AJPERES; Special Rapporteur on Adequate 
Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement, ¶ 32, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/18 (Feb. 5, 2007) 
(by Miloon Kothari) [hereinafter U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and 
Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions], available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ 
Issues/Housing/Guidelines_en.pdf. 
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basis for that determination.  
This Article makes recommendations to better ensure compliance with 
international law when States assert the public interest to justify 
development-based eviction. Essentially, the public interest justifying 
eviction: (1) must be undertaken solely to ensure the human rights of the most 
vulnerable, consistent with states’ international human rights obligations; (2) 
must be determined after considering all feasible alternatives, accounting for 
eviction impacts, in consultation with affected people; (3) should be 
reasonable and proportional, with a higher threshold where eviction 
threatens indigenous peoples or other vulnerable groups who depend on land 
for socioeconomic or cultural survival; (4) should not leave affected people 
vulnerable to human rights violations; and (5) should be accompanied by 
appropriate due process protections, including an effective opportunity to 
challenge the state’s justification of the public interest and protection from 
eviction during the challenge. The Article then presents the 
recommendations in the context of existing international standards 
applicable to development projects11 and illustrates how the 
recommendations could help ensure that development-based evictions 
premised on the public interest are consistent with international law. 
I. To Justify Eviction, a State’s Assertion of an Overriding 
Public Interest Must Be Consistent with International 
Law 
As the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (now Human Rights 
Council) affirmed in 1993, “the practice of forced evictions constitutes a gross 
violation of human rights, in particular the right to adequate housing” 
enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (“ICESCR”) as an element of the right to an adequate standard of 
living.12 The right to adequate housing provides that “all persons should 
possess a degree of security of tenure which guarantees legal protection 
 
 11. The World Bank is developing a set of environmental and social standards that will 
replace the Operational Policies analyzed in this Article. See WORLD BANK, ENVIRONMENTAL 
AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK: SETTING STANDARDS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (First 
Draft for Consultation 2014) [hereinafter WORLD BANK, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL 
FRAMEWORK], available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/07/19898916/ 
environmental-social-framework-setting-standards-sustainable-development. Because the 
framework is still in draft form, this Article relies primarily on the standards currently in effect (the 
Operational Policies). In some places, the Article notes the applicability of the Environmental and 
Social Framework based on the July 2014 draft. 
 12. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 1993/77, Forced Evictions, 67th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
E/C.4/RES/1993/77, ¶ 1 (Mar. 10, 1993); see also International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, art. 11(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
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against forced eviction.”13 Forced eviction also violates the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’s (“ICCPR”) prohibition of and 
protection from arbitrary or unlawful interference with one’s privacy, family, 
and home,14 as well as internationally protected rights of women15 and 
children.16 Forced eviction is thus “prima facie incompatible” with 
requirements of international human rights law.17 
Under international law, forced evictions “can only be justified in the most 
exceptional circumstances and in accordance with the relevant principles of 
international human rights law.”18 As examples of such “exceptional 
circumstances,” the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights has offered “the case of persistent non-payment of rent or of damage 
to rented property without any reasonable cause.”19 These examples differ 
markedly from development-based eviction, which occurs due to no fault of 
the displaced. 
Even under “exceptional circumstances,” “[e]victions require full 
justification given their adverse impact on a wide range of internationally 
recognized human rights.”20 Thus, evictions (1) must be authorized by law 
 
 13. CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶ 1 (citing CESCR, GENERAL 
COMMENT NO. 4, supra note 4, ¶ 8(a)). 
 14. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE (HRC), GENERAL COMMENT NO. 16: ARTICLE 17 
(RIGHT TO PRIVACY), THE RIGHT TO RESPECT OF PRIVACY, FAMILY, HOME AND 
CORRESPONDENCE, AND PROTECTION OF HONOUR AND REPUTATION ¶ 1 (1988) [hereinafter 
HRC, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 16], available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/ 
453883f922.html. 
 15. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 
18, 1979, art. 14(2)(h), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (State parties “shall ensure to women [in rural areas] the 
right . . . [t]o enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, 
electricity and water supply, transport and communications.”); CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 
7, supra note 2, ¶ 10 (“Women, children, youth, older persons, indigenous people, ethnic and other 
minorities, and other vulnerable individuals and groups all suffer disproportionately from the 
practice of forced evictions.”). 
 16. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 27(3), 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 
(“[States] shall in case of need provide material assistance and support programmes, particularly 
with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.”); CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 
2, ¶ 11. 
 17. CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 4, supra note 4, ¶ 18; CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT 
NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶ 1; U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on 
Development-Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 6; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “THEY PUSHED 
DOWN THE HOUSES”: FORCED EVICTIONS AND INSECURE LAND TENURE FOR LUANDA’S 
URBAN POOR 17 (May 2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/ 
angola0507/angola0507web.pdf. 
 18. CESCR, GENERAL. COMMENT NO. 4, supra note 4, ¶ 18 (emphasis added); CESCR, 
GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶¶ 5, 11, 14; U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate 
Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 21. 
 19. CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶11. 
 20. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
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and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare; (2) must be 
carried out only after all feasible alternatives have been explored in 
consultation with the affected people; (3) should be consistent with general 
principles of reasonableness and proportionality; (4) should not leave the 
affected people vulnerable to human rights violations; and (5) should be 
accompanied by appropriate due process protections afforded to those 
affected.21 This Section addresses these requirements with a view to when the 
public interest can constitute exceptional circumstances. 
A. The public interest justifying eviction must be “solely for 
the purpose of promoting the general welfare.” 
In many cases forced evictions are “authorized by law”22 because 
governments pass laws allowing expropriation in the public interest.23 This 
comports with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which 
explain that the prohibition of arbitrary displacement from one’s home 
includes “displacement . . . [i]n cases of large-scale development projects” 
unless they are “justified by compelling and overriding public interests.”24 
Accordingly, States have invoked a commonly established limitation on the 
right to property—the principle of eminent domain—to justify forced 
eviction on the basis of a public interest.25 
International law has provided some specificity as to what qualifies as 
“a compelling and overriding public interest.” Even if a domestic law 
authorizes forced eviction under eminent domain, to be justifiable under 
 
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 21. 
 21. See id.; ICESCR, supra note 12, art. 4; CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 
2, ¶¶ 3, 5, 11, 14; CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 4, supra note 4, ¶ 18. 
 22. See CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶ 3. 
 23. See, e.g., CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1996, ch. 1, art. 25; U.S. CONST. 
amend. V; CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, Aug. 25, 1992, art. 12(4). 
 24. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, princ. 6 (Feb. 11, 1988) [hereinafter Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement], available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IDPersons/ 
Pages/Standards.aspx. 
 25. See, e.g., Ley No. 6 de 3 de febrero de 1997 [Panama], “Por la cual se dicta el Marco 
Regulatorio e Institucional para la Prestación del Servicio Público de Electricidad,” art. 117 
(authorizing declaration of “all property necessary, convenient, and usually used for construction, 
installation, and activities of energy generation, connection, transmission, and distribution” as the 
public interest); Colombia, Mining Code (Law 685, Aug. 15, 2001), art. 13 (declaring “the mining 
industry in all its branches and stages” to be “of public service and social interest” and authorizing 
“expropriations of property of assets and all other rights constituted on them, that might be 
necessary for exercise and efficient development”); Peter Penz, Development, Displacement and Ethics, 
12 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 4, 4 (2002) (noting “the statement of Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first 
Prime Minister, that people displaced by dams had to make such sacrifices for the good of the 
country”). 
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international law, the eviction must be undertaken “solely for the purpose of 
promoting the general welfare.”26 This restriction comes from the ICCPR 
and ICESCR, both of which require that limitations on rights therein be 
“determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature 
of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in 
a democratic society.”27 The U.N. Principles and Guidelines on 
Development-Based Evictions and Displacement (U.N. Guidelines on 
Development-Based Evictions) define “the purpose of promoting the general 
welfare” as “steps taken by States consistent with their international human 
rights obligations, in particular the need to ensure the human rights of the 
most vulnerable.”28 As those guidelines explain, “an eviction may be 
considered justified if measures of land reform or redistribution, especially for 
the benefit of vulnerable or deprived persons, groups or communities, are involved.”29 At 
the same time, as the CESCR explained in its general comment on forced 
evictions, “the lack of development may not be invoked to justify the 
abridgement of internationally recognized human rights.”30 The U.N. 
Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions instruct States to “refrain, to 
the maximum extent possible, from claiming or confiscating housing or land, 
and in particular when such action does not contribute to the enjoyment of 
human rights,”31 and to apply appropriate penalties against anyone within 
its jurisdiction “that carries out evictions in a manner not fully consistent with 
applicable law and international human rights standards.”32 In other words, 
a State can only validly assert a public interest if it promotes the general 
welfare—especially the human rights of the most vulnerable—and if it 
 
 26. CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶ 5 (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 4, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; ICESCR, supra note 12, art. 4; U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 21. 
 27. ICCPR, supra note 26, art. 4; ICESCR, supra note 12, art. 4; see also CESCR, GENERAL 
COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶ 5 (noting that this restriction applies even in situations in which 
it may be necessary to impose limitations on the right to adequate housing and not to be subjected 
to forced eviction). 
 28. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 21 & n.d. 
 29. Id. ¶ 22 (emphasis added). 
 30. CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶ 18 (quoting U.N. World 
Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, June 25, 1993, 32 
I.L.M. 1661, Part I, ¶ 10); see also U.N. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 
41/128, pmbl., U.N. Doc A/141/53 (Dec. 4, 1986) (“[T]he promotion of, respect for and 
enjoyment of certain human rights and fundamental freedoms cannot justify the denial of other 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.”). 
 31. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 22. 
 32. Id. 
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accords with international human rights obligations. This includes refraining 
from taking land when that would threaten human rights and penalizing 
those who undertake unjustified eviction. 
From beautification projects in Angola to infrastructure projects in 
Indonesia to urban renewal in Zimbabwe,33 the declaration of a public 
interest has in many cases effectively legitimized projects that do not ensure 
the needs of the most vulnerable. Yet, “development-based evictions include 
evictions often planned or conducted under the pretext of serving the ‘public 
good’, such as those linked to development and infrastructure projects 
(including large dams, large-scale industrial or energy projects, or mining and 
other extractive industries); . . . and, ostensibly, environmental purposes.”34 
As Raquel Rolnik, former Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate 
Housing, observed, “[e]victions considered ‘legitimate’ shall always be 
related to works and projects that promote the public interest.”35 But a 
legitimate “public interest shall always be established by a participatory 
process that gives proper attention to, and takes into consideration, the views 
and interests of those living in the areas that would be impacted.”36 While it 
may be difficult to know exactly how to properly weigh those views and 
interests, a “public interest project should not render communities worse off 
than before.”37 
 
 33. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 17, at 6, 8; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
CONDEMNED COMMUNITIES: FORCED EVICTIONS IN JAKARTA (2006), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/09/05/condemned-communities; CTR. ON HOUS. RIGHTS & 
EVICTIONS, GLOBAL SURVEY ON FORCED EVICTIONS NO. 11: FORCED EVICTIONS: 
VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 33 (2009), available at http://www.cohre.org/sites/default/ 
files/global_survey_11_2009_-_no_pictures_0.pdf; U.N. HABITAT, FORCED EVICTIONS—
TOWARDS SOLUTIONS: SECOND REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON FORCED EVICTIONS 
TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF U.N.-HABITAT 13 (2007); U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON 
THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING, HOW TO DEAL WITH PROJECTS THAT INVOLVE FORCED 
EVICTIONS AND DISPLACEMENT (2010) [hereinafter U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON ADEQUATE 
HOUSING, FORCED EVICTIONS AND DISPLACEMENT], available at http://issuu.com/ 
unhousing/docs/guide_forced_eviction. 
 34. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 8; see also CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶ 7 
(“[I]nstances of forced eviction occur in the name of development.”). 
 35. U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON ADEQUATE HOUSING, FORCED EVICTIONS AND 
DISPLACEMENT, supra note 33, at 11; [European] Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature March 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, art. 1 
(entered into force May 18, 1954) (“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful 
enjoyment of his [or her] possessions. No one shall be deprived of his [or her] possessions except in 
the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 36. U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON ADEQUATE HOUSING, FORCED EVICTIONS AND 
DISPLACEMENT, supra note 33, at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 37. Id.; see also WORLD BANK, OP 4.12, supra note 10, ¶ 2(c) (“Displaced persons should be 
assisted in their efforts to improve their livelihoods and standards of living or at least to restore them, 
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B. Before determining whether an overriding public interest 
justifies forced eviction, all feasible alternatives, taking 
into account for eviction impacts, must be considered in 
consultation with affected people.  
To validly assert that the public interest justifies forced eviction, a state 
must first “explore fully all possible alternatives to evictions” in consultation 
with affected persons.38  
Regarding exploration of alternatives, before reaching a decision to 
evict, the State “must demonstrate that the eviction is unavoidable”39 and 
“must give priority to exploring strategies that minimize displacement.”40 As 
the architect of World Bank policy on involuntary resettlement, Michael 
Cernea, explained: 
Recognizing risks upfront and their financial implications is often a 
powerful stimulus to search for an alternative that will eliminate the need 
for displacement or cut down its size. This is technically possible in some 
cases, for instance, by changing the site of a dam or by re-routing a 
highway around (rather than through) a village. Many other technical 
options can be found through creative search.41 
 As Cernea noted with respect to the Impoverishment Risks and 
Reconstruction (IRR) model, which he developed to assess these kinds of 
risks, “[i]t does not add new tasks on top of the existing ones in preparing 
projects entailing resettlement. Instead, it saves efforts and increases 
effectiveness by (a) moving risk discovery upstream in project presentation, 
and (b) by helping reduce displacement, guiding early risk-elimination or 
risk-reduction actions.”42 
 One way to evaluate these risks is the eviction impact assessment.43 To 
 
in real terms, to pre-displacement levels or to levels prevailing prior to the beginning of project 
implementation, whichever is higher.”). 
 38. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 38; see also CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶ 13. 
 39. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 40. 
 40. Id. ¶ 32. 
 41. U.N. HABITAT, LOSING YOUR HOME, supra note 1, at 28 (quoting Michael Cernea, IRR: 
An Operational Risks Reduction Model for Population Resettlement, 1 HYDRO NEPAL: J. WATER, ENERGY 
& ENV’T 1, 39 (2007)). 
 42. Cernea, supra note 41, at 35. 
 43. See, e.g., U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON ADEQUATE HOUSING, FORCED EVICTIONS 
AND DISPLACEMENT, supra note 33, at 14. Despite the development of some tools for eviction 
impact assessment, such as the Housing and Land Rights Network loss matrix and the 
Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) model, U.N. Habitat observed that “there 
appears to be growing concern amongst experienced practitioners in the areas of development-
caused displacement that there is a massive gap between theory and practice.” U.N. HABITAT, 
LOSING YOUR HOME, supra note 1, at 58; see also Housing Rights Violation Loss Matrix, HABITAT INT’L 
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be effective, an eviction-impact assessment should explore alternatives and 
strategies for minimizing harm; should be “[c]omprehensive and holistic”; 
and “should be carried out prior to the initiation of any project that could 
result in development-based eviction and displacement, with a view to 
securing fully the human rights of all potentially affected persons, groups and 
communities, including their protection against forced evictions.”44 
With these objectives in mind, the eviction impact assessment 
necessitates establishment of “[c]lear criteria” to assess the impact of a project 
and the resulting eviction, considering “economic, . . . social and cultural 
aspects,” including “community interaction, . . . living conditions, and other 
non-material impacts such as psychological trauma and loss of services such 
as education and healthcare.”45 Given the differential impacts of forced 
evictions on women, children, the elderly, and marginalized sectors of 
society,46 impact assessments “should be based on the collection of 
disaggregated data, such that all differential impacts can be appropriately 
identified and addressed.”47 In addition, the criteria for eviction impact 
assessment “must be developed through a genuine consultative process . . . 
and must be carried out with the participation of the affected population.”48 
Because forced evictions raise issues of serious human rights violations, 
the people charged with assessing eviction impacts should be well versed in 
relevant human rights law.49 To that end, “[a]dequate training in applying 
international human rights norms should be required and provided for 
relevant professionals, including lawyers, law enforcement officials, urban 
and regional planners and other personnel involved in the design, 
management and implementation of development projects.”50 In light of the 
 
COAL.–HOUS. & LAND RIGHTS NETWORK (HIC–HLRN), http://www.hic-
mena.org/documents/Loss%20Matrix.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). 
 44. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 32. 
 45. U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON ADEQUATE HOUSING, FORCED EVICTIONS AND 
DISPLACEMENT, supra note 33, at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 46. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 33; see also CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶ 10. 
 47. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 33. 
 48. U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON ADEQUATE HOUSING, FORCED EVICTIONS AND 
DISPLACEMENT, supra note 33, at 14. 
 49. See U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 34. 
 50. Id.; see also U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED NATIONS 
“PROTECT, RESPECT AND REMEDY” FRAMEWORK princ. 8, at 8–10 (2011) [hereinafter U.N. 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS], available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf (“States 
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disproportionate effects evictions have on women,51 “[t]his must include 
training on women’s rights, with an emphasis on women’s particular 
concerns and requirements pertaining to housing and land.”52 
Exploration of alternatives must occur with the participation of affected 
people. Generally speaking, “[p]rojects that result in involuntary 
displacement without the involvement of affected parties in the planning and 
decision-making processes do not comply with international human rights 
standards.”53 To be sure, international law recognizes the public’s right to 
participate in decision-making on environmental matters and that 
“[e]nvironmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned 
citizens, at the relevant level.”54 
In the context of forced eviction, the U.N. Guidelines explain that all 
potentially affected groups and persons, as well as others working on behalf 
of the affected, “have the right to . . . propose alternatives that authorities 
should duly consider,” as well as to “relevant information, full consultation 
and participation throughout the entire process.”55 After the impact 
assessment study is complete, the results “must be publicized and used to 
decide whether to go ahead with the project or not.”56 A State must not 
inform the affected people of the project, and resulting eviction, as a fait 
accompli.57 
 
should ensure that governmental departments, agencies and other State-based institutions that 
shape business practices are aware of and observe the State’s human rights obligations when 
fulfilling their respective mandates, including by providing them with relevant information, training 
and support.”). 
 51. CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶ 10. 
 52. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 34. 
 53. U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON ADEQUATE HOUSING, FORCED EVICTIONS AND 
DISPLACEMENT, supra note 33, at 9. 
 54. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., 
June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 10, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]; see 
generally U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 
2161 U.N.T.S. 447 [hereinafter Aarhus Convention]. 
 55. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 38; see also U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON ADEQUATE HOUSING, 
FORCED EVICTIONS AND DISPLACEMENT, supra note 33, at 9. 
 56. U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON ADEQUATE HOUSING, FORCED EVICTIONS AND 
DISPLACEMENT, supra note 33, at 14. 
 57. See Centre for Minority Rights Dev. and Minority Rights Grp. Int’l v. Kenya, African 
Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Commc’n No. 276/2003, May 2009, ¶ 281 (“The African 
Commission . . . is convinced that community members were informed of the impending project as 
a fait accompli, and not given an opportunity to shape the policies or their role in the Game Reserve.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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Timing is important. In many instances in which eviction-impact 
assessment requirements exist, they do not take effect until after a decision to 
allow the forced eviction, thereby failing to ensure that alternatives were fully 
explored in consultation with the communities.58 This defeats eviction-
impact assessments’ purpose of helping to demonstrate whether the state 
“explor[ed] strategies that minimize displacement” and whether eviction was 
indeed “unavoidable.”59  
Timely, comprehensive, participatory eviction impact assessments can 
inform the determination of whether the public interest is compelling. For 
instance, often when evictions are justified “in the name of a public interest 
or purpose, such as . . . the reduction of pollution and congestion of a river,” 
“[t]he impact of the eviction on the affected communities is presented as 
justifiable in light of the benefits of a cleaner river to a broader community 
and the city as a whole.” 60  
However if an [eviction-impact assessment] is conducted and the findings 
illustrate just how severely the residents will be affected . . . , while 
complementary research illustrates that the perceived public gains (such 
as reduction of pollution) will be less significant than previously thought, 
the argument for a policy shift and change of the development plan can 
become compelling.61 
C. The public interest justifying forced eviction should be 
consistent with general principles of reasonableness and 
proportionality under international law. 
For the public interest to justify forced eviction, the eviction should be 
reasonable and proportional in the given circumstances.62 When indigenous 
peoples’ rights are implicated, limitations must be “strictly necessary” to meet 
“the just and most compelling requirements of a democratic society.”63 
Both the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the 
U.N. Human Rights Committee (the bodies that oversee the ICESCR and 
 
 58. See WORLD BANK, OP 4.12, supra note 10, ¶¶ 20, 26; WORLD BANK, OP 4.12 – ANNEX A, 
supra note 10, ¶ 14; IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 5, ¶ 19, at 36, ¶ 31, 
at 38–39, Standard 1, ¶ 14, at 9–10. 
 59. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶¶ 32, 40. 
 60. U.N. HABITAT, LOSING YOUR HOME, supra note 1, at 48. 
 61. Id. 
 62. CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶ 14; see also Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement, supra note 24, Annotation, at 13, 17 (clarifying that for “compelling and 
overriding public interests” to “justify [development-related displacement] . . . the requirements of 
necessity and proportionality [must be] met.”). 
 63. See U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, art. 46(2), 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP]. 
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ICCPR, respectively) have noted that “interference with a person’s home can 
only take place in cases envisaged by the law,” and that “the law should be 
in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and 
should be, in any event, reasonable in the particular circumstances.”64 Thus, 
regardless of whether national law might allow the state’s expropriation 
power to supersede other interests65 and force eviction, the eviction should 
be “reasonable and proportional” in light of the asserted public interest.66  
Regional human rights bodies have upheld this principle. For instance, 
the right to property under the American Convention on Human Rights 
provides that “[t]he law may subordinate” the right to use and enjoy property 
“to the interest of society” and deprive people of their property “for reasons 
of public utility or social interest.”67 According to the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights (Inter-American Court), “[t]he necessity of legally 
established restrictions will depend on whether they are geared toward 
satisfying an imperative public interest,” which the court views as requiring 
more than proof of “a useful or timely purpose.”68 Regarding 
proportionality, the restriction must be “closely adjusted to the attainment of 
a legitimate objective, interfering as little as possible with the effective 
exercise of the restricted right.”69 “Finally,” the restrictions “must be justified 
by collective objectives that, because of their importance, clearly prevail over 
the necessity of full enjoyment of the restricted right.”70 Following this 
reasoning, when faced with “conflicting interests in indigenous claims” to 
land, the Inter-American Court has determined that “it must assess in each 
case the legality, necessity, proportionality and fulfillment of a lawful purpose 
in a democratic society (public purposes and public benefit), to impose 
restrictions on the right to property, on the one hand, or the right to 
 
 64. CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶ 14 (quoting HRC, GENERAL 
COMMENT NO. 16, supra note 14, ¶¶ 3–4, 8 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 65. See, e.g., CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA (2004), art. 50 (“Cuando de la aplicación 
de una ley expedida por motivos de utilidad pública o de interés social, resultaren en conflicto los 
derechos de particulares con la necesidad reconocida por la misma ley, el interés privado deberá ceder al 
interés del público o social.” [“When the application of a law enacted for reasons of public utility or 
social interest results in a conflict between private rights and the need recognized by that law itself, 
the private interest must yield to the public or social interest.”] (emphasis added)). 
 66. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 21. 
 67. American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica,” Nov. 22, 1969, 
1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, art. 21(1)–(2). 
 68. Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 
145 (June 17, 2005). 
 69. Id. (citations omitted). 
 70. Id. 
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traditional lands, on the other.”71 This assessment is consistent with the U.N. 
Declaration on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights’s provision for limitations on its 
rights only when “strictly necessary” to secure due recognition and respect 
for others’ rights and freedoms and to meet “the just and most compelling 
requirements of a democratic society.”72 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has taken a 
similar approach. Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, any restriction on a right therein “must be proportionate to a 
legitimate aim that does not interfere adversely on the exercise of” the right.73 
In the landmark case Centre for Minority Rights Development and Minority Rights 
Group International v. Kenya, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights held that Kenya violated the rights of the indigenous Endorois peoples 
by taking their land for the asserted public interest of creating a game 
reserve.74 There, the African Commission found that “encroachment [wa]s 
not proportionate to any public need and [wa]s not in accordance with 
national and international law.”75 In reaching this conclusion, the African 
Commission held: 
The “public interest” test is met with a much higher threshold in the case 
of encroachment of indigenous land rather than individual private 
property. In this sense, the test is much more stringent when applied to 
ancestral land rights of indigenous peoples.76 
Quoting the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, the African 
Commission continued: 
Limitations, if any, on the right [of] indigenous peoples to their natural 
resources must flow only from the most urgent and compelling interest of 
the state. Few, if any, limitations on indigenous resource rights are 
appropriate, because the indigenous ownership of the resources is 
associated with the most important and fundamental human rights, 
 
 71. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, 
¶ 138 (Mar. 29, 2006) (finding that the expropriation of land for restitution to indigenous people 
from whom the land had been taken in violation of international law constituted a valid public 
purpose) (citation omitted); see also Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 217 (“If the traditional territory is in private hands, the State must assess 
the legality, necessity and proportionality of expropriation or non-expropriation of said lands to 
attain a legitimate objective in a democratic society.”). 
 72. UNDRIP, supra note 63, art. 46(2). 
 73. Centre for Minority Rights Dev. and Minority Rights Grp. Int’l v. Kenya, African 
Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Commc’n No. 276/2003, May 2009, ¶ 249. 
 74. Id. ¶¶ 214, 238. 
 75. Id. ¶ 238. 
 76. Id. ¶ 212. 
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including the right to life, food, the right to self-determination, to shelter, 
and the right to exist as a people.77 
Thus, while there is no bright-line test for whether a forced eviction is 
“reasonable and proportional,” in some circumstances, such as forced 
eviction of indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups whose 
socioeconomic and cultural survival often depends on access to their 
ancestral lands,78 international law supports subjecting the state’s asserted 
justification of the public interest to heightened scrutiny.79 
D. The public interest cannot justify forced eviction where 
the affected people will be vulnerable to human rights 
violations. 
Even where the public interest may appear reasonable and proportional 
to justify eviction, it “should not result in individuals being rendered homeless 
or vulnerable to the violation of other human rights.”80 This recognition is 
important given that “forced evictions frequently violate other human 
rights”81—or, as the U.N. Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions 
explain, “constitute gross violations of a range of internationally recognized 
human rights, including the human rights to adequate housing, food, water, 
health, education, work, security of the person, security of the home, freedom 
from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and freedom of 
movement.”82 
At the most basic level, forced eviction is incompatible with the right to 
adequate housing, which requires States, at a minimum, to “refrain from 
forced evictions”; to ensure enforcement of the law against its agents or third 
parties who carry out forced evictions;83 and not to introduce any deliberately 
 
 77. Id. (quoting Erica-Irene Daes, Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Land and Natural Resources, in 
MINORITIES, PEOPLES AND SELF-DETERMINATION 75, 89 (Nazila Ghanea & Alexandra Xanthaki 
eds. 2005) (emphasis omitted)). 
 78. See, e.g., Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, 2010 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 214, ¶¶ 171–82 (Aug. 24, 2010) (recognizing indigenous peoples’ close ties to their lands and 
natural resources and the significant adverse impacts evictions have on their identity and cultural 
survival); Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, 2012 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
245, ¶¶ 146–47 (June 27, 2012). 
 79. See Centre for Minority Rights Dev. and Minority Rights Grp. Int’l v. Kenya, African 
Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Commc’n No. 276/2003, May 2009, ¶ 212; UNDRIP, 
supra note 63, art. 46(2). 
 80. CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶ 16. 
 81. Id. ¶ 4. 
 82. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 6; see also GENERAL COMMENT No. 7, supra note 2, ¶ 4. 
 83. CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶ 8; see also U.N. Special Rapporteur 
on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 58 
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retrogressive measures regarding protection against forced evictions.84 
Forced eviction can also infringe on the right to adequate food,85 which 
prohibits States from taking any measures that result in preventing “existing 
access to adequate food.”86 As former Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Food, Olivier de Schutter, has recognized, “where [forced eviction] leads to 
depriving [affected] families from their means of producing food, it also is a 
violation of the right to food.”87 Beyond responsibility for its own actions, 
States must take “measures . . . to ensure that enterprises or individuals do 
not deprive individuals of their access to adequate food.”88  
Where development displaces indigenous peoples, concerns arise about 
violations of indigenous peoples’ rights. Because indigenous peoples often 
depend on their land for socioeconomic and cultural survival,89 where a 
project would forcibly displace indigenous peoples, eviction will almost 
invariably leave the affected people vulnerable to human rights violations. 
This is especially true because international human rights law provides 
heightened protection of indigenous peoples’ rights.90 For example, sources 
in international law establish that relocation of indigenous peoples cannot 
occur without their free, prior, and informed consent.91 Thus, where 
indigenous peoples do not consent to relocation, the prohibition on forced 
 
(“Persons, groups or communities affected by an eviction should not suffer detriment to their human 
rights, including their right to the progressive realization of the right to adequate housing.”). 
 84. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 18. 
 85. See OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N. HABITAT, 
FORCED EVICTIONS: FACT SHEET NO. 25 REV. 1, at 11, 47 (2014) [hereinafter FACT SHEET NO. 
25], available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FS25.Rev.1.pdf. 
 86. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/issues/food/Pages/FoodIndex.aspx (last visited Nov. 19, 
2014). 
 87. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
Addendum – Mission to Nicaragua, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/33/Add.5 (Dec. 8, 2009) (by Olivier De 
Schutter). 
 88. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, supra note 86. 
 89. See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 149 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
 90. See, e.g., Saramaka People v. Suriname, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. of Human Rights (ser. C) No. 
172, ¶¶ 90, 96 (Nov. 28, 2007). 
 91. See UNDRIP, supra note 63, art. 10; Int’l Labour Org., Convention Concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, art. 16(1)–(2), 1650 
U.N.T.S. 383 [hereinafter ILO Convention]; Saramaka People v. Suriname, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. 
of Human Rights (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 134; INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, INDIGENOUS 
AND TRIBAL PEOPLES’ RIGHTS OVER THEIR ANCESTRAL LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES: 
NORMS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM ¶ 334 (2009), 
available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/indigenous/docs/pdf/ 
AncestralLands.pdf. 
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evictions should be especially hard to overcome even for a compelling public 
interest. As noted in Section I.B.3, the African Commission on Human and 
People’s Rights applied “a much higher threshold” to “the ‘public interest’ 
test” when indigenous peoples faced eviction from their land, given their 
dependence on the land for socioeconomic or cultural survival.92 
Nonetheless, States have bypassed the requirement to obtain free, prior and 
informed consent when they have declared projects to be in the public 
interest.93  
One example illustrating development-based eviction that would leave 
affected people vulnerable to human rights violations is the Barro Blanco 
dam project in western Panama. This project threatens to forcibly evict 
indigenous Ngöbe families who never consented to leave their land,94 and 
who depend on their land for subsistence and culture.95 The government of 
Panama declared the project in the “public interest” and “of an urgent 
character to satisfy basic needs of the community” pursuant to a summary 
procedure,96 without informing the affected peoples of how the Barro Blanco 
project meets this standard97 and without adequately considering the 
resulting impacts on the affected Ngöbe people’s physical, economic, and 
cultural survival.98 This is not a case in which the government was unaware 
of the project’s impacts on indigenous peoples. Although in the project’s 
initial environmental impact assessment in 2008, the project proponent 
averred that the dam would have no impacts in indigenous lands and that no 
 
 92. See Centre for Minority Rights Dev. and Minority Rights Grp. Int’l v. Kenya, African 
Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Commc’n No. 276/2003, May 2009, ¶ 212. 
 93. See, e.g., Ngöbe Indigenous Cmtys. and Their Members in the Changuinola River Valley 
v. Panama, Pet. No. 286-08, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Rep. No. 75/09, ¶ 34 (Aug. 5, 2009) (noting the 
petitioners’ amparo petition alleging constitutional violations of the Ngöbe’s fundamental rights due 
to “several alleged facts inter alia: the approval of the [c]oncession . . . which allowed the resettlement 
of the Ngöbe communities without having produced a Relocation Plan for the Chan-75 Project and 
without the free, prior and informed consent of the communities”); Ley No. 6 de 3 de febrero de 
1997 [Panama], “Por la cual se dicta el Marco Regulatorio e Institucional para la Prestación del 
Servicio Público de Electricidad,” arts. 117 (“Utilidad Pública), 122 (“Traslado”). 
 94. See Brief for Interamerican Ass’n for Envtl. Def. (AIDA) et al. as Amici Curiae, Demanda 
Contencioso Administrativa de Nulidad contra la Resolución DIEORA IA-332-2008 de 9 de mayo 
de 2008, de la Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter AIDA Brief], available 
at http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/files/BARROBLANCO-AMICUS13029.pdf. 
 95. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME (UNDP), INFORME DE LA MISIÓN DE VERIFICACIÓN: 
REALIZADA DEL 23 AL 28 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 2012 [MISSION VERIFICATION REPORT, 
CONDUCTED FROM SEPTEMBER 23–28, 2012] 18–30, 37 (2012). 
 96. Resolución AN No. 6103-Elec de 22 de abril de 2013, “Resuelve,” ¶ 1 [Panama] (citing 
Ley 18 de 26 de marzo de 2013, art. 138-A). 
 97. See id. 
 98. AIDA Brief, supra note 94, at 21–22. 
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one would be relocated,99 the reality of these impacts are no longer in 
dispute.100 As documented by a UNDP expert assessment, the flood area 
encompasses indigenous Ngöbe’s land, houses, and natural resources.101 
These impacts threaten a number of the Ngöbe’s rights, including to housing, 
food, water, and culture. Given the lack of adequate consultation and free, 
prior, and informed consent, eviction will also violate the Ngöbe’s land 
rights.102 Panama has nonetheless allowed dam construction to continue and 
has notified affected families of taking of their land for this project. Panama 
thus has failed to ensure that eviction of these indigenous Ngöbe people will 
not leave them vulnerable to violations of their human rights. 
E. States should ensure appropriate due process protections 
regarding its assertion that the public interest justifies 
forced eviction. 
If—under the most exceptional circumstances, after the consideration 
of all feasible alternatives, in accordance with relevant international law, and 
without leaving affected people vulnerable to human rights violations—
forced evictions appear to be justified by a public interest that promotes the 
general welfare, even then, the State has a duty to ensure the affected people 
are afforded due process protections before evictions can take place. As the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted, “[a]ppropriate 
 
 99. See Demanda Contencioso Administrativa de Nulidad contra la Resolución DIEORA IA-
332-2008 de 9 de mayo de 2008, de la Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente, ¶¶ 2, 17 (on file with 
author). 
 100. See generally UNDP Expert Assessment Reports: LUIS LÓPEZ GARCÍA & INGENIERO, 
UNDP, PERITAJE INDEPENDIENTE DE LA PRESA DE BARRO BLANCO, PANAMÁ: INFORME FINAL 
DE LA COMPONENTE DE INGENIERÍA HIDRÁULICA [INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE DAM 
OF BARRO BLANCO, PANAMA: FINAL REPORT OF THE HYDRAULIC ENGINEERING 
COMPONENT] (2013) [hereinafter UNDP, PERITAJE—HIDRÁULICA], available at http://media. 
gestorsutil.com/PNUD_web/651/centro_informacion_documentos/docs/091071800137849923
4.pdf; GONZALO CASTRO DE LA MATA, UNDP, PERITAJE AL PROYECTO HIDROELÉCTRICO 
BARRO BLANCO: ANÁLISIS DE LOS ASPECTOS ECOLÓGICOS Y ECONÓMICOS [EVALUATION OF 
THE BARRO BLANCO HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECOLOGICAL AND 
ECONOMIC IMPACT] (2013) [hereinafter UNDP, PERITAJE—ECOLÓGICO Y ECONÓMICO], 
available at http://media.gestorsutil.com/PNUD_web/651/centro_informacion_documentos/ 
docs/0981925001378498682.pdf; GONZALO CASTRO DE LA MATA, PNUD, PERITAJE AL 
PROYECTO HIDROELECTRICO BARRO BLANCO: RESULTADOS DEL DIAGNOSTICO RURAL 
PARTICIPATIVO [EVALUATION OF THE BARRO BLANCO HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT: RESULTS 
OF THE PARTICIPATORY RURAL APPRAISAL] (2013), available at http://media.gestorsutil. 
com/PNUD_web/651/centro_informacion_documentos/docs/0276982001378499109.pdf. 
 101. See, e.g., UNDP PERITAJE—ECOLÓGICO Y ECONÓMICO, supra note 100, ¶ 16. 
 102. See UNDRIP, supra note 63, art. 10; ILO Convention, supra note 91, art. 16(1); Saramaka 
People v. Suriname, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. of Human Rights (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 134 (Nov. 28, 2007); 
INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES’ RIGHTS OVER 
THEIR ANCESTRAL LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 91, ¶ 107. 
690 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
 
procedural protection and due process . . . are especially pertinent in relation 
to a matter such as forced evictions which directly invokes a large number of 
the rights recognized in both the International Covenants on Human 
Rights.”103 Those protections include an opportunity for genuine 
consultation with those affected; adequate and reasonable notice104—
announced in writing in the local language105—to all affected persons prior 
to the eviction date; information on the proposed evictions, and, where 
applicable, on the alternative purpose for which the land or housing is to be 
used, to be made available in reasonable time to all those affected; provision 
of legal remedies; and provision, where possible, of legal aid to persons who 
are in need of it to seek redress from the courts.106 These protections accord 
with States’ duties regarding access to information, public participation in 
decision-making processes, and access to justice in environmental matters 
outlined in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration and in treaties such as the 
Aarhus Convention.107 
Given that “[a]ll persons threatened with or subject to forced evictions 
have the right of access to timely remedy, . . . includ[ing] a fair hearing,”108 
people affected by a state’s determination that the public interest justifies 
taking of their land have a right to challenge that determination and the 
justification for it. The fact that “relevant legislation must specify in detail the 
precise circumstances in which such interferences may be permitted” should 
promote the ability of affected people to challenge a state’s justification based 
on the public interest.109 Similarly, given that “[t]he eviction notice should 
contain a detailed justification for the decision, including on: (a) absence of 
reasonable alternatives; (b) the full details of the proposed alternative; and (c) 
where no alternatives exist, all measures taken and foreseen to minimize the 
adverse effects of evictions,”110 affected people could use that information to 
challenge the government’s purported justification. 
 
 103. CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶ 15 (referring to the ICCPR and 
ICESCR). 
 104. Id. ¶15(a)–(b). 
 105. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 41. 
 106. CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶ 15(b–c), (g–h). 
 107. See Rio Declaration, supra note 54, princ. 10; see generally Aarhus Convention, supra note 
54. 
 108. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 59. 
 109. CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶ 14 (quoting HRC, GENERAL 
COMMENT NO. 16, supra note 14, ¶¶ 3–4, 8) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 110. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 41. 
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In “ensur[ing] that adequate and effective legal or other appropriate 
remedies are available to all those who undergo, remain vulnerable to, or 
defend against forced evictions,”111 States have a duty “to ensure an effective 
remedy for persons whose rights have been violated” and to “enforce such 
remedies when granted.”112 This means that “States must ensure that 
individuals, groups and communities are protected from eviction during the 
period that their particular case is being examined before a national, regional 
or international legal body.”113 In practice, however, evictions often occur 
pursuant to a summary procedure, through which governments need not 
provide a detailed justification to the affected people.114 Governments in 
many instances have proceeded with eviction even when a decision is 
pending before a judicial body.115 
II. Recommendations for Project Finance Standards to 
Ensure that Evictions Based on Public Interest Are 
Consistent with International Law 
Forced evictions concern human rights obligations of states, businesses, 
and financial institutions.116  
Under international law, States have duties to respect, protect, and 
fulfill human rights, including extraterritorially.117 For example, as the 
Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligation of States in the area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights make clear, “States must desist from 
 
 111. Id. ¶ 22; see also id. ¶ 17 (“States must ensure that adequate and effective legal or other 
appropriate remedies are available to any person claiming that his/her right to protection against 
forced evictions has been violated or is under threat of violation.”). 
 112. CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶ 13 (quoting ICCPR, supra note 26, 
art. 2.3). 
 113. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 36. 
 114. See, e.g., CESCR, Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
India, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/IND/CO/5 (May 2008) (The Committee “remains deeply 
concerned about the reports of displacement and forced evictions in the context of land acquisition 
by private and state actors for the purposes of development projects, [and] . . . that the members of 
disadvantaged and marginalised groups . . . are adversely affected by such displacement.”); Ngöbe 
Indigenous Cmtys. and Their Members in the Changuinola River Valley v. Panama, Pet. No. 286-
08, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Rep. No. 75/09, ¶ 34 (Aug. 5, 2009); see also HOUS. AND LAND RIGHTS 
NETWORK, HOW TO RESPOND TO FORCED EVICTIONS, supra note 9, at 3. 
 115. Ngöbe Indigenous Cmtys. and Their Members in the Changuinola River Valley v. 
Panama, Pet. No. 286-08, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Rep. No. 75/09, ¶ 34; see also FACT SHEET NO. 25, 
supra note 85, at 30 (“In many cases, houses are destroyed without a court order or without giving 
residents enough time to appeal against the decision to evict.”). 
 116. See generally U.N. GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 
50 (describing human rights obligations of states, businesses, and financial institutions). 
 117. See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 12, art. 2(1). 
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acts and omissions that create a real risk of nullifying or impairing the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially.”118 
Beyond States’ duty to “refrain from violating human rights domestically and 
extraterritorially,”119 in the context of forced eviction the U.N. Guidelines on 
Development-Based Evictions instruct States to “ensure that other parties 
within the State’s jurisdiction and effective control do not violate the human 
rights of others; and take preventive and remedial steps to uphold human 
rights and provide assistance to those whose rights have been violated.”120  
Although “States bear the principal obligation for applying human 
rights,” this does not “absolve other parties, including project managers and 
personnel, international financial and other institutions or organizations, 
transnational and other corporations, and individual parties, including 
private landlords and landowners, of all responsibility.”121 Specifically, 
“[t]ransnational corporations and other business enterprises must respect the 
human right to adequate housing, including the prohibition on forced 
evictions, within their respective spheres of activity and influence.”122 
Similarly, “[i]nternational financial, trade, development and other related 
institutions and agencies, including member or donor States that have voting 
rights within such bodies, should take fully into account the prohibition on 
forced evictions under international human rights law and related 
standards.”123  
In light of these duties, States, businesses, and international financial 
institutions should take measures to ensure compliance with international 
law with respect to forced evictions. States’ laws, businesses’ codes of 
conduct, and international financial institutions’ policies all offer a means to 
 
 118. ETO CONSORTIUM, MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES ON EXTRATERRITORIAL 
OBLIGATION OF STATES IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 7–10 
(2013), available at http://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/library/maastricht-principles/?tx_ 
drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid%5D=23. 
 119. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 12; see also U.N. GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS, supra note 50, princ. 1–3. 
 120. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 12; see also U.N. GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS, supra note 50, princ. 3. 
 121. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 11. 
 122. Id. ¶ 73. 
 123. Id. ¶ 71; see also U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON ADEQUATE HOUSING, FORCED 
EVICTIONS AND DISPLACEMENT, supra note 33, at 32 (“Financing agencies—the World Bank, 
Inter-American Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, international financial institutions, 
international cooperation agencies, central and local governments: should use these guidelines in 
their projects to minimise displacement and protect human rights, and also as a criteria for 
allocation of resources for housing purposes.”). 
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impose requirements related to forced evictions.  
In the context of development, conditions and requirements tied to 
international financial assistance can provide leverage over funding 
recipients to meet requirements to respect international law. International 
financial institutions, such as the World Bank and its private-lending arm, 
the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”), as well as climate finance 
mechanisms, such as the Green Climate Fund, can provide sources of 
finance-tied obligations, e.g., through safeguards against social and 
environmental harm.  
This Article focuses on policies and standards of international financial 
institutions (“IFIs”)—specifically those of the World Bank and IFC—because 
they are in practice the most influential in safeguards standard-setting.124  
 
Through their financing relationships, the IFIs exert enormous 
influence over policy-makers in lending and  
borrowing countries alike, shaping development norms  
and paradigms—including definitions of what constitutes  
“development.” The role that IFIs play in shaping standards and 
policies is particularly critical for [development-induced displacement 
and resettlement (DIDR)], because few borrower countries have a 
national resettlement law or policy framework governing DIDR and 
national frameworks that do exist are often inadequate. This absence of 
domestic law means that the policies and guidelines generated by IFIs 
serve as the de facto standard or model for many private sector 
companies operating in the Global South.125 
 
This weighty influence manifests itself in the sense that failure to certain 
meet requirements can mean, from the financial institution’s standpoint, the 
project does not proceed.126  
 
 124. See KATE HOSHOUR & JENNIFER KALAFUT, INT’L ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, A 
GROWING GLOBAL CRISIS: DEVELOPMENT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT & RESETTLEMENT 2 
(2010), http://accproject.live.radicaldesigns.org/downloads/IAP%208.10%20Briefer.pdf; id. at 7 
n.9 (“[I]n many cases private corporations, acting with the cooperation of national governments 
and seeking financing from public financial institutions or private banks, are the drivers of forced 
displacement.”). 
 125. Id. at 3. 
 126. See WORLD BANK, OP 4.10: Indigenous Peoples ¶¶ 2, 20 (rev. 2013) [hereinafter WORLD 
BANK, OP 4.10], in THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 10; id. ¶ 11 (Where 
indigenous communities’ support is required, “[t]he Bank does not proceed further with project 
processing if it is unable to ascertain that such support exists.”); see also INT’L FIN. CORP., 
GUIDANCE NOTES: PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL 
SUSTAINABILITY, Guidance Note 5, ¶ GN68, at 26 (2012) [hereinafter IFC GUIDANCE NOTES], 
available at http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/e280ef804a0256609709ffd1a5d13d27/GN_ 
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The World Bank has developed environmental and social safeguards in 
its Operational Policies (OPs),127 which provide a benchmark for 
environmental and social policies of multilateral development banks, 
national development banks, and other international financial institutions.128 
The IFC has developed environmental and social safeguards through its 
Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability 
(Performance Standards).129 World Bank policies and IFC standards have 
helped shape project finance standards in developing countries and among 
private banks, including the Equator Principles.130  
Both the World Bank and the IFC have policies specific to forced 
eviction. World Bank OPs address forced eviction in OP 4.12: Involuntary 
Resettlement.131 IFC Performance Standards address forced eviction in 
Performance Standard 5: Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement.132 
In the following Sections, this Article reviews existing World Bank 
OPs133 and IFC Performance Standards (World Bank and IFC policies) on 
forced eviction and shows how the recommendations discussed in Part I can 
enhance those policies’ ability to ensure compliance with international law 
when a state asserts the public interest to justify forced eviction. 
 
English_2012_Full-Document.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (“Where the client ascertains that the 
outcome of the government-managed resettlement is unlikely to meet the requirements of 
Performance Standard 5, and the client is unable or not permitted to fill the gaps required to meet 
those requirements, consideration should be given to not proceeding with the project.”). 
 127. THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 10. 
 128. HOSHOUR & KALAFUT, supra note 124, at 5. 
 129. IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra note 10. 
 130. HOSHOUR & KALAFUT, supra note 124, at 5 (“[O]ver 60 private banks have formally 
adopted a set of World Bank environmental and social standards known as the Equator 
Principles.”); see also EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES: A FINANCIAL 
INDUSTRY BENCHMARK FOR DETERMINING, ASSESSING, AND MANAGING SOCIAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK IN PROJECT FINANCING (2013), available at http://www.equator-
principles.com/resources/equator_principles_II.pdf. 
 131. WORLD BANK, OP 4.12, supra note 10. 
 132. IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 5, at 31–39. 
 133. As noted above, the World Bank is developing an Environmental and Social Framework, 
which will replace its Operational Policies, and has released a draft of those standards. See WORLD 
BANK, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 11. In the following 
section, this Article notes the applicability of the draft framework in some places where relevant. 
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A. Project finance standards should ensure that the public 
interest justifying eviction is undertaken solely for the 
purpose of promoting the general welfare, i.e., the 
human rights of the most vulnerable. 
Under international law, to justify forced eviction based on the public 
interest, it must be undertaken solely for the purpose of promoting the 
general welfare. World Bank and IFC policies thus should ensure the public 
interest asserted to justify eviction in a World Bank- or IFC-financed project 
achieves this purpose. Although neither the World Bank nor the IFC 
currently provides for much, if any, scrutiny of a public interest asserted to 
justify a project,134 both already require the provision of information that 
would enable scrutiny of that justification.135 World Bank and IFC policies 
on involuntary resettlement both require the borrower or client to provide a 
comparative analysis of applicable national law on expropriation vis-à-vis the 
applicable World Bank or IFC provision.136 Both then establish that 
additional measures may be required to bridge any gap between the 
applicable government’s measures and the World Bank or IFC’s 
requirements, respectively.137 
For example, Annex A to World Bank OP 4.12 requires an analysis of 
the scope of the power of eminent domain and the nature of associated 
compensation; the applicable legal and administrative procedures, including 
a description of available judicial remedies and possibly relevant alternative 
 
 134. IFC guidance makes provision for review of the expropriation process, but not of the 
validity of the determination itself. See IFC GUIDANCE NOTES, supra note 126, Guidance Note 5, ¶ 
GN69, at 26 (stating that the client will review the government’s expropriation process against IFC 
requirements if it becomes protracted and compensation is depressed). 
 135. See WORLD BANK, OP 4.12 – Annex A, supra note 10, ¶ 7; IFC PERFORMANCE 
STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 5, ¶ 31, at 38–39, Standard 1, ¶ 5, at 7, ¶ 7–12, at 7–9; 
WORLD BANK, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 11, ¶ 22 (“The 
Borrower will document all transactions to acquire land rights, provision of compensation and other 
assistance associated with relocation activities.”), WORLD BANK, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
SOCIAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 11, ¶ 27 (“The Borrower will not resort to forced evictions of 
affected persons.” (footnote omitted)). 
 136. See WORLD BANK, OP 4.12, supra note 10, ¶ 7; IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra 
note 10, Standard 5, ¶ 31, at 38–39 (requiring description of regulated activities, including the 
entitlements of displaced persons provided under applicable national law and regulations, and 
providing for client’s review thereof); IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 5, 
¶ 2, at 5. 
 137. See WORLD BANK, OP 4.12 – Annex A, supra note 10, ¶ 7; IFC PERFORMANCE 
STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 5, ¶ 31, at 38–39; WORLD BANK, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL 
AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 11, ¶ 33 (“If the procedures or performance standards of 
other responsible agencies do not meet the relevant requirements of this [standard], the Borrower 
will prepare supplemental arrangements or provisions for inclusion in the resettlement plan to 
address identified shortcomings.”). 
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dispute resolution mechanisms; and “gaps, if any, between local laws 
covering eminent domain and resettlement and the Bank’s resettlement 
policy, and the mechanisms to bridge such gaps.”138 
 As for the IFC, Performance Standard 5 provides for the client to 
collaborate with governments to help achieve environmental and social 
outcomes consistent with the Performance Standards even where the client 
may have no direct control over the decision.139 As the IFC explains, “[a]t 
times, the assessment and management of certain environmental and social 
risks and impacts may be the responsibility of the government or other third 
parties over which the client does not have control or influence.”140 For 
instance, “this may happen . . . when early planning decisions are made by 
the government or third parties which affect the project site selection and/or 
design.”141 Yet, the Performance Standards do not view the client’s lack of 
direct control over these decisions as a reason to eliminate the client’s role in 
helping to mitigate environmental and social risks. 
While the client cannot control these government or third party actions, 
an effective [Environmental and Social Management System] should 
identify the different entities involved and the roles they play, the 
corresponding risks they present to the client, and opportunities to 
collaborate with these third parties in order to help achieve 
environmental and social outcomes that are consistent with the 
Performance Standards.142 
Thus, both the World Bank and IFC have established provisions for the 
borrower or client to take measures to ensure that the government’s 
expropriation of land conforms to World Bank and IFC policies. To ensure 
consistency with international law, in their respective provisions on the 
analysis of applicable law on expropriation and early planning decisions, 
each institution should specify that a valid public purpose that could justify 
forced eviction must be “undertaken solely for the purpose of promoting the 
general welfare, . . . i.e., to ensure the human rights of the most vulnerable, 
consistent with states’ international human rights obligations.”143 Failure to 
meet this requirement should mean that the project “does not proceed.”144  
 
 138. WORLD BANK, OP 4.12 – Annex A, supra note 10, ¶ 7. 
 139. See IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 5, ¶ 30, at 38. 
 140. Id. Standard 1, ¶ 2, at 5. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 21. 
 144. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, OP 4.10, supra note 126, ¶ 11 (Where indigenous communities’ 
support is required, “[t]he Bank does not proceed further with project processing if it is unable to 
ascertain that such support exists.”); OXFAM AUSTRALIA, BANKING ON SHAKY GROUND: 
AUSTRALIA’S BIG FOUR BANKS AND LAND GRABS 52 (2014) (directing banks to require, before 
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B. Project finance standards should require eviction impact 
assessment for evaluating alternatives, and proof that 
eviction costs were taken into account in evaluating 
alternatives. 
To ensure compliance with international law, World Bank and IFC 
policies should ensure that any determination that the public interest justifies 
forced eviction considered alternatives and took into account eviction 
impacts. World Bank and IFC policies on involuntary resettlement both 
encourage outcomes that would minimize displacement145 and require 
assessment of eviction impacts and inclusion of those results in evaluating 
total project costs.146 However, neither policy requires eviction-impact 
assessment until occur after the determination has been made to proceed 
with the project. Requiring assessment of eviction impacts as part of the 
alternatives assessment would better promote outcomes that minimize 
displacement.147  
The key is thus timing. World Bank Operational Policy 4.01 on 
Environmental Assessment, recognizes the value of beginning environmental 
assessment “as early as possible in project processing” so that it can be 
“integrated closely with the economic, financial, institutional, social, and 
technical analyses of a proposed project.148 Indeed, the environmental 
assessment (EA) informs the Bank’s decision to fund a project: “The Bank 
does not finance project activities that would contravene [certain] country 
obligations, as identified during the EA.”149 Likewise, identifying eviction 
impacts early in the process, particularly during the consideration of 
alternatives, would further the Bank’s ability to make informed decisions 
about the projects it funds and enable it to abandon a project if the impacts 
 
provision of a product or service to a client, that the client “[r]efrain from cooperating with any 
host governments’ illegitimate use of eminent domain, in order to acquire farmland”). 
 145. See WORLD BANK, OP 4.12 – Annex A, supra note 10, ¶ 4; IFC PERFORMANCE 
STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 5, ¶ 3, at 32 (stating an objective “[t]o avoid, and when 
avoidance is not possible, minimize displacement by exploring alternative project designs”); 
WORLD BANK, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 11, Standard 5, 
¶¶ 1–2, at 55, ¶ 7, at 59. 
 146. See World Bank, OP 4.12, supra note 10, ¶¶ 17, 20, 26; WORLD BANK, OP 4.12 – Annex A, 
supra note 10, ¶¶ 4, 6, 14; IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 5, ¶ 19, at 36, 
¶ 31, at 38–39; IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 1, ¶ 14, at 9–10; WORLD 
BANK, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 11, Standard 5, ¶ 7, at 
59, ¶ 16, at 60–61. 
 147. See Cernea, supra note 41, at 35. 
 148. WORLD BANK, OP 4.01: Environmental Assessment ¶ 19 (rev. 2013), in THE WORLD BANK 
OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 10. 
 149. Id. 
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appear to be more severe than initially anticipated.150 World Bank OP 4.12 
should thus require eviction-impact assessments as early as possible, and 
certainly before assessment of alternatives. 
For its part, IFC Performance Standard 5 requires consideration of 
“feasible alternative project designs to avoid or minimize physical and/or 
economic displacement, while balancing environmental, social, and financial 
costs and benefits, paying particular attention to impacts on the poor and 
vulnerable.”151 Yet it does not require assessment of eviction impacts until 
later in the process.152 Requiring an eviction-impact assessment at the 
alternatives assessment stage would improve accuracy in balancing 
environmental, social, and financial costs and benefits, and in determining 
whether an asserted public interest is justified.153 
To better ensure that projects ostensibly justified by a public interest are 
consistent with international law, World Bank and IFC policies should 
require assessment of eviction impacts as part of the alternatives assessment, 
and proof that the alternatives assessment took into account the costs of 
eviction. Given that total project costs include the “full costs of resettlement 
activities necessary to achieve the objectives of the project,”154 in the interest 
of accuracy, the consideration of alternatives should take into account those 
costs in determining whether the public interest promoted by the proposed 
development project in fact justifies forced eviction. 
C. Project finance standards should ensure that public 
interest justifying eviction is “reasonable and 
proportional” to the public interest, and subject to a 
higher threshold where eviction threatens rights of 
indigenous peoples or other vulnerable, natural 
resource-dependent groups. 
World Bank and IFC policies should ensure forced eviction is 
reasonable and proportional to—and where indigenous people are involved, 
necessary to achieve—the asserted public interest. World Bank and IFC 
 
 150. See id.; see also U.N. GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 
50, princ. 19 (“[T]o prevent and mitigate adverse human rights impacts, business enterprises should 
integrate the findings from their impact assessments across relevant internal functions and 
processes, and take appropriate action.”). 
 151. IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 5, ¶ 8, at 33. 
 152. See id. Standard 5, ¶ 19, at 36, ¶ 31, at 38–39. 
 153. See U.N. HABITAT, LOSING YOUR HOME, supra note 1, at 29; Cernea, supra note 41; 
U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON ADEQUATE HOUSING, FORCED EVICTIONS AND 
DISPLACEMENT, supra note 33, at 14. 
 154. WORLD BANK, OP 4.12, supra note 10, ¶ 20. 
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policies both impose some requirements in proportion to the level of risk or 
impact.155  
As a clear example, World Bank and IFC policies on involuntary 
resettlement each impose an additional set of requirements when a project 
could forcibly displace indigenous peoples156 because of the distinct types of 
risks and levels of impacts forced eviction can have on indigenous peoples,157 
including loss of identity, culture, and customary livelihoods, and exposure 
to disease.158 Thus, where indigenous peoples face eviction, the World Bank 
and IFC impose stricter requirements for project preparation, including 
those related to exploring alternative project designs to avoid physical 
displacement.159 Both impose heightened requirements related to 
consultation (“free, prior, and informed consultation” for World Bank 
projects and “free, prior, and informed consent” for IFC projects).160  
 
 155. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, OP 4.10, supra note 126, ¶ 7(noting the detail necessary to meet 
specified requirements is proportional to the proposed project’s complexity); IFC PERFORMANCE 
STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 1, ¶ 15, at 10 (“The level of detail and complexity of this 
collective management program and the priority of the identified measures and actions will be 
commensurate with the project’s risks and impacts, and will take account of the outcome of the 
engagement process with Affected Communities as appropriate.”); IFC PERFORMANCE 
STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 5, ¶ 14, at 35 (“The extent of monitoring activities [regarding 
implementation of a Resettlement Action Plan or Livelihood Restoration Plan] will be 
commensurate with the project’s risks and impacts.”); IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra note 
10, Standard 5, ¶ 15, at 35 (“It may be necessary for the client to commission an external completion 
audit of the Resettlement Action Plan or Livelihood Restoration Plan to assess whether the 
provisions have been met, depending on the scale and/or complexity of physical and economic 
displacement associated with a project.”); WORLD BANK, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL 
FRAMEWORK, supra note 11, Standard 5, ¶¶ 17, 19, at 61, ¶ 21, at 62. 
 156. See generally WORLD BANK, OP 4.10, supra note 126; IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, 
supra note 10, Standard 7, at 47–52; WORLD BANK, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL 
FRAMEWORK, supra note 11, Standard 7, at 74–83. 
 157. WORLD BANK, OP 4.10, supra note 126, ¶¶ 2, 20; IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra 
note 10, Standard 7, ¶ 1, at 47; see also WORLD BANK, OP 4.12, supra note 10, ¶ 8 (“[P]articular 
attention is paid to the needs of vulnerable groups among those displaced, especially those below 
the poverty line, the landless, the elderly, women and children, indigenous peoples, ethnic 
minorities, or other displaced persons who may not be protected through national land 
compensation legislation.” (footnote omitted)); IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra note 10, 
Standard 5, ¶ 10, at 34. 
 158. WORLD BANK, OP 4.10, supra note 126, ¶¶ 2, 20; IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra 
note 10, Standard 7, ¶ 1, at 47. 
 159. See WORLD BANK, OP 4.10, supra note 126, ¶ 7; id. ¶ 10 (requiring additional measures 
related to consultation and participation for projects involving indigenous peoples). Compare 
WORLD BANK, OP 4.12, supra note 10, ¶ 9 (“[T]he Bank satisfies itself that the borrower has 
explored all viable alternative project designs to avoid physical displacement of [indigenous] 
groups.”), with id. ¶ 2 (“[As an] overall objective[], . . . (a) [i]nvoluntary resettlement should be 
avoided where feasible, or minimized, exploring all viable alternative project designs.”). Compare 
IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 5, ¶¶ 8–10, at 33–34, with IFC 
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 7, ¶¶ 14–17, at 50–51. 
 160. WORLD BANK, OP 4.10, supra note 126, ¶ 20; IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra 
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In addition, the World Bank’s policy on indigenous peoples (OP 4.10) 
establishes that “[t]he level of detail necessary to meet [certain] 
requirements . . . is proportional to the complexity of the proposed project 
and commensurate with the nature and scale of the proposed project’s 
potential effects on the Indigenous Peoples, whether adverse or positive.”161 
For instance, regarding the social assessment to evaluate the project’s 
potential effects on indigenous peoples and to examine project alternatives, 
“[t]he breadth, depth, and type of analysis in the social assessment are 
proportional to the nature and scale of the proposed project’s potential effects 
on the Indigenous Peoples, whether such effects are positive or 
adverse . . . .”162 
Given the World Bank’s and the IFC’s recognition of the heightened 
effects of displacement on indigenous peoples,163 and each institution’s 
imposition of stricter requirements in certain circumstances depending on 
the gravity of the risk, each should require that eviction be reasonable and 
proportional—and where indigenous peoples face eviction, necessary—to 
the asserted public interest. 
D. Project finance standards should ensure that public 
interest justifying eviction do not leave the affected 
people vulnerable to human rights violations. 
To achieve compliance with international law, the World Bank and IFC 
policies should refrain from financing projects for which eviction will leave 
people vulnerable to human rights violations even where the public interest 
is asserted to justify eviction. Both the World Bank and IFC recognize the 
need to respect human rights in relation to projects they finance.164 Although 
 
note 10, Standard 5, ¶ 10, at 34; see also IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 
7, ¶ 2, at 47–48, ¶ 10–17, at 49–51. The World Bank Draft Environmental and Social Framework 
include circumstances that require free, prior, and informed consent before a project can proceed. 
WORLD BANK, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 11, Standard 7, 
¶¶ 19–27, at 78–81. 
 161. WORLD BANK, OP 4.10, supra note 126, ¶ 7. The requirements referred to above pertain 
to preparation of a social assessment; free, prior, and informed consultation at each stage of the 
project; and preparation of an Indigenous Peoples Plan or an Indigenous Peoples Planning 
Framework. Id. 
 162. Id. ¶ 9. 
 163. See id. ¶¶ 2, 20; IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 7, ¶ 1, at 47 
(recognizing indigenous peoples’ close ties to their lands and natural resources and the significant 
adverse impacts evictions have on their identity and cultural survival). 
 164. See Ana Palacio, Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank Group, 
The Way Forward: Human Rights and the World Bank, WORLD BANK, 36 (Oct. 27, 2006), available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/RR8FOU4RG0 (“‘[I]t is now evident that human rights are an intrinsic 
part of the Bank’s mission.’” (quoting Roberto Dañino, former Senior Vice President and General 
Counsel of the World Bank Group, Legal Opinion on Human Rights and the Work of the World Bank, 
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World Bank policy does not condition its funding on compliance with human 
rights law,165 Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank 
Group Ana Palacio has acknowledged the “need for recognition of the role 
of human rights as legal principles, which may inform a broad range of 
activities, . . . and provide a normative baseline against which to assess 
development policies and programming.”166 As she explained, 
in certain cases and under certain circumstances, human rights generate 
actionable legal obligations. Such obligations may arise from international 
treaties, or from rights enshrined in national laws. Here the Bank’s role is 
to support its Members to fulfill those obligations where they relate to 
Bank projects and policies.167 
Although historically the World Bank had regarded human rights as a 
domestic political affair into which it should not meddle,168 in the words of 
Ms. Palacio, “[i]t is now clear that the Bank can and sometimes should take 
human rights into consideration as part of its decision-making process.”169 
Furthermore, Ms. Palacio acknowledged the need for collective monitoring 
and enforcement of human rights obligations, “against which the concept of 
state sovereignty is no longer an absolute shield.”170  
 
WORLD BANK (Jan. 27, 2006)); IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 1, ¶ 3, 
at 6; WORLD BANK, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 11, ¶ 3, at 
5 (“[T]he Bank’s operations are supportive of human rights and will encourage respect for them in 
a manner consistent with the Bank’s Articles of Agreement.”). 
 165. Nor does the World Bank expressly reference human rights obligations in its Operational 
Policy on Involuntary Resettlement. See WORLD BANK, OP 4.12, supra note 10. The outset of World 
Bank’s Operational Policy on Indigenous Peoples does highlight the “Bank’s mission of poverty 
reduction and sustainable development by ensuring that the development process fully respects the 
dignity, human rights, economies, and cultures of Indigenous Peoples.” WORLD BANK, OP 4.10, 
supra note 126, ¶ 1 (footnote omitted); see also WORLD BANK, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
SOCIAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 11, Standard 7, ¶ 3, at 74 (using similar language). 
 166. Palacio, supra note 164, at 36. 
 167. Id. 
 168. “Political human rights in particular have traditionally been considered to lie beyond the 
permitted range of considerations under the Articles of Agreement, which bar decisions based on 
political considerations or political systems, as well as interference in domestic political affairs of its 
members. The World Bank’s role is a facilitative one, in helping our members realize their human 
rights obligations. In this sense, human rights would not be the basis for an increase in Bank 
conditionalities, nor should they be seen as an agenda that could present an obstacle for 
disbursement or increase the cost of doing business.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 169. Id. (“[The 2006 document from then-World Bank’s General Counsel] marks a clear 
evolution from the pre-existing restrictive legal interpretation of the Bank’s explicit consideration 
of human rights. It is ‘permissive’: allowing, but not mandating, action on the part of the Bank in 
relation to human rights. It clarifies ‘the state of the law,’ and gives the Bank the necessary leeway 
to explore its proper role in relation to human rights, updating the legal stance adopted internally 
to accord with the Bank’s practice and the current international legal context. It facilitates a more 
comprehensive understanding of human rights in development, and enables the Bank to take these 
issues into account where they are relevant.” (quoting Dañino, supra note 164)). 
 170. Palacio, supra note 164 (citing HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL 
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Given the World Bank’s recognition that human rights are relevant to 
its decision-making and generate “actionable legal obligations,” the World 
Bank should refrain from supporting projects for which a State justifies forced 
eviction based on a public interest that leaves affected people vulnerable to 
human rights violations.171 
The IFC, for its part, acknowledges that forced evictions should not lead 
to human rights violations. For instance, in its commentary on its 
resettlement policy, the IFC recognizes that, to be justified, forced evictions 
must be carried out “in accordance with the law and in conformity with the 
provisions of the [ICCPR and ICESCR]”172 As explained above, forced 
evictions that leave affected people vulnerable to human rights violations are 
not consistent with obligations under the ICCPR and ICESCR.173 
Furthermore, in relation to all of its Performance Standards, the IFC 
recognizes businesses’ duty to respect human rights, along with the value of 
human rights due diligence.174 Performance Standard 1 proclaims, “Business 
should respect human rights, which means to avoid infringing on the human 
rights of others and address adverse human rights impacts business may 
cause or contribute to.”175 Noting that “[e]ach of the Performance Standards 
has elements related to human rights dimensions that a project may face in 
the course of its operations,” the IFC explained that “[d]ue diligence against 
these Performance Standards will enable the client to address many relevant 
human rights issues in its project.”176 The IFC further noted that “[i]n limited 
high risk circumstances, it may be appropriate for the client to complement 
its environmental and social risks and impacts identification process with 
specific human rights due diligence as relevant to the particular 
business”177—recommending, in this respect, an IFC guide on human rights 
impact assessments.178  
 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 573 (2d ed. 2000)) (citations omitted). 
 171. See Palacio, supra note 164 (emphasis omitted); OXFAM AUSTRALIA, supra note 144, at 52 
(directing banks to require, before provision of a product or service to a client, that the client 
“[r]efrain from cooperating with any host governments’ illegitimate use of eminent domain, in 
order to acquire farmland”). 
 172. IFC GUIDANCE NOTES, supra note 126, Guidance Note 5, ¶ GN55, at 21 (citing CESCR, 
GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶ 3); see also IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra note 
10, Standard 5, ¶ 24, at 37 (“Forced evictions will not be carried out except in accordance with law 
and the requirements of this Performance Standard.” (footnote omitted)). 
 173. See CESCR, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 7, supra note 2, ¶ 16. 
 174. IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 1, ¶ 3, at 6. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. ¶ 7 n.12. 
 178. See IFC GUIDANCE NOTES, supra note 126, Guidance Note 1, ¶ GN47, at 16, (citing 
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Additionally, among the objectives of IFC’s Performance Standard on 
indigenous peoples are “[t]o ensure that the development process fosters full 
respect for the human rights, dignity, aspirations, culture, and natural 
resource-based livelihoods of Indigenous Peoples.”179 In its Guidance Notes, 
the IFC refers to international treaties on indigenous rights as a source of 
responsibilities not only for States, but also for the private sector: 
[I]t is increasingly expected that private sector companies conduct their 
affairs in a way that would uphold these rights and not interfere with 
states’ obligations under these instruments. . . . [Accordingly,] private 
sector projects are increasingly expected to foster full respect for the 
human rights, dignity, aspirations, cultures, and customary livelihoods of 
Indigenous Peoples.180 
Given the numerous human rights implicated by forced eviction, and 
the IFC’s recognition of the duty to respect human rights, it would serve the 
IFC’s objectives to instruct businesses as part of their human rights due 
diligence to ensure that a public interest ostensibly justifying forced evictions 
will not lead to human rights violations. 
E. Project finance standards should ensure that the public 
interest justifying eviction is accompanied by 
appropriate due process protections, including an 
effective opportunity to challenge a State’s assertion of 
the public interest, and protection from eviction during 
the challenge. 
Both the World Bank and IFC policies call for due process protections. 
The World Bank requires that “[d]isplaced persons and their communities, 
and any host communities receiving them, are provided timely and relevant 
information, consulted on resettlement options, and offered opportunities to 
participate in planning, implementing, and monitoring resettlement,” and 
that “[a]ppropriate and accessible grievance mechanisms are established for 
these groups.”181 The IFC recognizes provision of legal remedies among the 
key safeguards to prevent unjustified involuntary evictions.182 As the IFC 
 
available at http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/8ecd35004c0cb230884bc9ec6f601fe4/ 
hriam-guide-092011.pdf?MOD=AJPERES). 
 179. IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 7, ¶ 2, at 47. 
 180. IFC GUIDANCE NOTES, supra note 126, Guidance Note 7, ¶ GN1, at 2. 
 181. WORLD BANK, OP 4.12, supra note 10, ¶ 13(a); see also WORLD BANK, DRAFT 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 11, Standard 5, at 56 n.5 (To be justified, 
forced eviction must, among other requirements, be “conducted in a manner consistent with basic 
principles of due process (including provision of adequate advance notice, meaningful opportunities 
to lodge grievances and appeals, and avoidance of the use of unnecessary, disproportionate or 
excessive force).”). 
 182. See IFC GUIDANCE NOTES, supra note 126, Guidance Note 5, ¶ GN55, at 21. 
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explains in its Guidance Notes, “Performance Standard 5 contains many of 
the substantive and procedural safeguards necessary for involuntary 
resettlement to be carried out without resort to forced evictions” and notes 
that when forced eviction is unavoidable, it should conform to those 
requirements.183 The Guidance Notes cite “key procedural protections” 
noted by the U.N. Office of High Commissioner, including “adequate and 
reasonable notice for all affected persons prior to the scheduled date of 
eviction” and “provision of legal remedies.”184 The Guidance Notes also 
point to “the international human rights principles laid out in the U.N. 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement” as a source of “useful guidance 
regarding rights and protections for internally displaced persons.”185 Those 
principles require States, among other things, to take adequate measures “to 
guarantee to those to be displaced full information on the reasons and 
procedures for their displacement.”186 This information is crucial to ensuring 
affected people’s ability to seek an effective remedy against unlawful eviction, 
particularly where the public interest is the basis for the eviction. Consistent 
with a displaced person’s right to a remedy, including a fair hearing, both the 
World Bank and IFC policies instruct financing recipients to establish a 
grievance mechanism.187 World Bank OP 4.12 calls for the establishment of 
“[a]ppropriate and accessible grievance mechanisms” for displaced persons 
and their communities188 to allow for third-party settlement of disputes 
arising from resettlement.189 Similarly, IFC Performance Standards call for 
the establishment of a “recourse mechanism designed to resolve disputes in 
an impartial manner” as a means to “address specific concerns about 
compensation and relocation raised by displaced persons or members of host 
communities in a timely fashion.”190 
IFC Performance Standard 1 “supports the use of an effective grievance 
mechanism that can facilitate early indication of, and prompt remediation 
for those who believe that they have been harmed by a client’s actions.”191 
Noting that “the assessment and management of certain environmental and 
 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. Guidance Note 5, ¶ GN6, at 3 (citing Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, supra note 
24). 
 186. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, supra note 24, princ. 7(3)(b). 
 187. See WORLD BANK, OP 4.12, supra note 10, ¶ 13(a); IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, 
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 191. Id. Standard 1, at 1. 
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social risks and impacts may be the responsibility of the government or other 
third parties over which the client does not have control or influence,” the 
IFC implies that its grievance mechanism could consider “early planning 
decisions . . . , which affect the project site selection and/or design,” even 
though the client lacks direct control over the decision.192 A government’s 
expropriation in the public interest could be considered an “early planning 
decision[] . . . which affect[s] the project site selection and/or design” and 
thus should be subject to review of a grievance mechanism—even where a 
client may have had no control or influence over the government’s 
decision.193 
At present, neither the World Bank nor IFC calls for review of public 
interest justifications to determine consistency with international law 
obligations. However, World Bank and IFC policies already provide for 
establishment or use of a forum to review grievances, including those related 
to forced evictions. To ensure the provision of appropriate due process 
protections and effective remedies, World Bank and IFC policies should 
ensure that affected people have an effective opportunity to challenge the 
justification for the eviction, and are protected from eviction during the 
challenge.194 
 
CONCLUSION: Recommendations to Ensure that Public 
Interest Determinations Are Justified and Consistent 
with International Law 
Despite the establishment of more and better models, assessment 
techniques, policy frameworks and statutory requirements, and an 
“increasing tone of urgency and even exasperation” in academic and 
practitioners’ literature on development-induced displacement, “capital-
intensive, high-technology, large-scale development projects have 
nevertheless continued to wreak havoc in the lives of up to 15 million 
displaced people per year, leaving impoverishment and misery in their 
wake.”195 Many of these projects are ostensibly justified based on a State’s 
assertion of the public interest. Acknowledging that justifications for forced 
evictions to serve a public interest are invariably authorized by law, and that 
 
 192. Id. Standard 5, ¶ 30, at 38; id. Standard 1, ¶ 2, at 5. 
 193. See id. Standard 1, ¶ 2, at 5. 
 194. See U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Principles and Guidelines on Development-
Based Evictions, supra note 10, ¶ 36. 
 195. U.N. HABITAT, LOSING YOUR HOME, supra note 1, at 56–57. 
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the fact of legality under domestic law does not ensure that forced evictions 
will comply with international human rights law, this Article recommends 
increasing scrutiny of public interest determinations such that the public 
interest justifying eviction: 
1) is undertaken solely for the purpose of promoting the general 
welfare, i.e., to ensure the human rights of the most vulnerable, 
consistent with states’ international human rights obligations; 
2) is determined after considering all feasible alternatives, 
accounting for eviction impacts, in consultation with affected 
people; 
3) is reasonable and proportional, with a higher threshold where 
eviction threatens indigenous peoples or other vulnerable groups 
who depend on land for socio-economic or cultural survival; 
4) does not leave the affected people vulnerable to human rights 
violations; and 
5) is accompanied by appropriate due process protections, 
including an effective opportunity to challenge the validity of the 
public interest justification and protection from eviction during 
judicial challenge. 
 
 Project finance standards can be an effective tool to ensure that 
projects comply with international law. Indeed, the World Bank’s July 2014 
draft of its Environmental and Social Framework state that the Bank will 
“support Borrowers in achieving good international practice relating to 
environmental and social sustainability” and that “[t]he Borrower will not 
resort to forced evictions of affected persons.”196 Taken together, these 
statements illustrate how project finance standards are an appropriate place 
to establish requirements that uphold the prohibition under international law 
on forced evictions. As discussed in this Article, World Bank and IFC policies 
have some relevant provisions, but need to increase their scrutiny of public 
interest determinations, for instance, by incorporating this Article’s five 
recommendations into their policies and standards. These protections not 
only serve to implement international law obligations applicable to 
development projects, but also aim to prevent human rights violations in the 
pursuit of sustainable, responsible development.  
 
 196. WORLD BANK, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 11, at 
1, ¶; id. ¶ 27, at 10. 
